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SUSTAINED CORPORATE CORRUPTION AND PROCESSES OF INSTITUTIONAL ASCRIPTION 
WITHIN PROFESSIONAL NETWORKS 
 
ABSTRACT 
The last twenty years have seen some of the most dramatic cases of corporate corruption. One of 
the most striking features of these cases is the inability of professionals and professional firms to 
recognize and publicize corporate corruption. In this essay, we argue that professionals’ failure to 
detect corporate corruption may be the result of institutional ascription that occurs within 
professional networks. Institutional ascription occurs as professionals ascribe probity and 
diligence to the behaviour of other professionals, and may contribute to sustain corporate 
corruption. Understanding the conditions and mechanisms that facilitate – or impede – 
institutional ascription is thus important and we offer suggestions for how this line of research 
might be advanced. 
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SUSTAINED CORPORATE CORRUPTION AND PROCESSES OF INSTITUTIONAL ASCRIPTION 
WITHIN PROFESSIONAL NETWORKS 
 
The last two decades have witnessed numerous and often dramatic cases of corporate fraud. 
Although several of the most sensational cases occurred in the United States, nevertheless 
corruption is a ‘worldwide problem that cuts across ideological and cultural divides’ (Zahra et al., 
2005). The economic and social costs are substantial. In the United States alone, the estimated 
cost ranges from $200 billion to $600 billion per year (Schnatterly, 2003). In the United 
Kingdom, fraud in 2013 was estimated to be around £52bn (The National Fraud Authority, 
2013). And in Italy the ‘hole’ left by Parmalat alone was equivalent to 1% of the national GDP 
(Macintosh & Quattrone, 2010). Further, indications suggest that the incidence of fraud is 
increasing (Coffee, 2005). At the end of 2011, 726 cases of corporate fraud were being pursued 
throughout the United States, several of which involved losses to investors in excess of $1 billion 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010-2011). Perhaps more importantly, corporate fraud has 
shaken faith in financial markets. As The New York Times (2012) points out, ‘capitalism cannot 
function without trust’. Yet, the National Opinion Research Council reported that in 2010 only 
11% of respondents had confidence in banks and financial institutions.   
Implicated in fraud and its outcomes are professional service firms. Even though these firms 
usually did not - although sometimes they did - wittingly and actively participate in fraud, they 
nevertheless failed to perceive and expose it. Analysts, audit and accounting firms, law firms, 
investment banks, and rating agencies, whose collective function is to ensure the probity of 
financial markets and to nurture the trust necessary for markets to function, were found seriously 
wanting. Santoro and Strauss (2013: 8-9), referring to the financial crisis of 2008, scathingly 
denounced ‘the cavalcade of incompetence, corruption and recklessness’ and pointed to ‘the 
lawyers and accountants who saw, heard, and spoke no evil and who blithely papered over the 
whole fiasco’.  
Not surprisingly, research on the role of professionals, and, in particular, of professional service 
firms, has attracted interest and gained momentum. Within this stream, important questions have 
been raised and significant insights obtained. In this essay, however, we propose that current 
research is dominated by a set of assumptions that restrict our attempts to understand the 
relationship between professional firms and the practice of corporate corruption. We argue that 
most accounts focus on a single professional, asking questions such as how and why they 
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colluded in concealing fraud (e.g., Arnold & de Lange, 2004; Braun, 2000; Cullinan, 2004); or, 
they focus upon a single profession and ask questions about the incentive and control 
mechanisms of the employing organization, and/or the effect of peer pressure, such as ‘herding 
behavior’ (e.g., Cote & Goodstein 1999; Angle & McCabe 2013), but networks are rarely the 
focus of inquiry (although, see Clark & Newell, 2013). Most cases of corporate corruption, 
however, raise the role of such networks and it is with these networks that we are primarily 
concerned. For us, a critical yet neglected question is: Why did regulatory gatekeepers, collectively, 
fail to uncover and expose sustained corporate corruption?  
In this essay, therefore, we do three things. First, we illustrate our focal interest by summarizing 
two highly publicized cases of corporate fraud practiced over a lengthy period – Enron and 
Parmalat. In doing so, we highlight and indicate the (deficient) role of gatekeeper networks. 
Second, we briefly review the literature on the relationship between professionals and their 
clients, noting the shift from an earlier assumption that the key risk is professionals taking 
advantage of their clients, to recognition of the risks of client capture and the loss of professional 
independence. We introduce the notion of ‘institutional ascription’ which has been shown to 
contribute to field-level regulatory failure (Gabbioneta et al., 2013) and review the argument that 
processes of institutional ascription dull the ability and motivation of gatekeepers to look for 
sustained corporate corruption. Third, we advance a research agenda and offer suggestions for 
how we might proceed. We identify where further research is needed in order to nuance and 
extend emerging theory, and, in so doing, inform policy.  
Before turning to these themes, we acknowledge that our interest constitutes only part of the 
story. In some instances the ethical probity of professionals and professional service firms – e.g., 
Arthur Andersen in the Enron case and Grant Thornton in the Parmalat case - was clearly 
inadequate (Grey, 2003; Chabrak & Daidj, 2007). We recognize that the gatekeepers may practice 
corruption, but this is not our interest here.  
 
SUSTAINED CORPORATE FRAUD: TWO EXAMPLES 
Our focus of interest can be illustrated by the examples of Enron and Parmalat. Partly this choice 
is because these cases are notorious and high profile. As Coffee (2005: 206) has said: ‘Parmalat is 
the paradigmatic fraud for Europe (just as Enron and WorldCom are the representative frauds in 
the United States)’. In addition, these examples are dramatic in their scale and fraud was practised 
over several years: i.e., corruption was a sustained occurrence not a one-off irregularity. But they 
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are not atypical (Dyck et al., 2013). On the contrary, the basic observations that we provide 
below also apply to numerous other, less dramatic cases.  
Our particular interest, as noted above, is with the ring of ‘gatekeepers’ (Coffee, 2005: 2006; 
Gilson & Kraakman, 1984)*, which involves several clusters of actors, including several that 
profess to be self-regulating professions. Auditors examine a company’s financial statements to 
ensure that they are ‘accurate, truthful, and complete and prepared according to a set of 
[accepted] accounting standards’, and to provide a written report that contains an opinion as to 
whether these financial statements are fairly stated and comply with the accounting standards 
(SEC, 2002). Securities analysts analyze a company’s financial accounts, assess the company’s future 
profitability, and offer advice to their clients (institutional investors) who are considering 
purchasing a company’s shares. Analysts ‘exercise independent professional judgment when 
conducting investment analysis, making investment recommendations, taking investment actions, 
and engaging in other professional activities’ (CFA, 2013). Rating agencies assess a corporation’s 
ability to pay back debt acquired through borrowing, make timely interest payments, and the 
likelihood of default. Investment banks assist corporations raise capital by underwriting and/or 
acting as the client’s agent in the issuance of securities. As such, they conduct due diligence to 
ensure that their client’s securities are worth purchasing. Finally, law firms assess the legality of 
commercial transactions, and advise corporations on their legal rights and duties. They provide 
legal advice on mergers and acquisitions, equity and bond issues, and disclosure requirements.  
So, how well did these gatekeepers perform their roles in the Enron and Parmalat cases? 
 
Enron 
Enron Corporation was a U.S. energy company based in Houston, Texas. Prior to its bankruptcy 
in late 2001, it was one of the world’s leading electricity, gas, pulp and paper, and 
communications companies, with claimed revenues of $101 billion in 2000. The company 
achieved infamy at the end of 2001, when it was revealed that, for over a decade, its reported 
financial condition had been sustained by institutionalized, systematic, and creatively planned 
accounting fraud. The fraud was accomplished by putting debts and losses into ‘offshore’ entities 
that were not included in the company’s financial statements; and, by the use of sophisticated and 
arcane financial transactions between Enron and related companies formed to remove 
                                                            
* The term ‘gatekeepers’ was, to our knowledge, first used by Gilson & Kraakman (1984). It refers to field-level 
intermediaries who provide assurance to investors concerning information on corporate securities, equity offerings 
and similar data. The term is widely used by academics and regulators (e.g., the SEC). 
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unprofitable entities from the company’s books. The company collapsed on December 2, 2001, 
leaving behind $15 billion in debt, worthless shares, and 20,000 workers who had lost their jobs. 
The scope and length of Enron’s fraud highlight the failure of financial market professionals to 
detect and report corporate corruption. Arthur Andersen (who audited Enron’s financial 
statements) was accused of ‘helping Enron design accounting techniques or “models” that Enron 
could use to report income, cash flow and financial position more favourably than if the financial 
statements and related disclosures faithfully represented the economic substance of the 
transaction’; of having ‘failed to exercise due care in auditing whether the third party entities used 
by Enron in its Prepay Transactions were SPEs† and whether the 3% equity investments in the 
SPEs utilized by Enron in its FAS 140 Transactions were at risk’; and, of having failed to inform 
the company’s audit committee about both the accounting policies in use at Enron and the 
unusual transactions the company had conducted (Batson Report, 2003: 40-41). As pointed out 
in the Batson report (2003: 39), ‘Enron’s financial statements and related disclosures were 
materially misleading. For example, virtually all of Enron’s $979 million of net income and $3 
billion of funds flow from operating activities for the year 2000, and approximately $8.6 billion of 
fully recourse indebtedness not reflected on Enron’s balance sheet as of December 31, 2000, 
were attributable to six accounting techniques used by Enron. Each of these accounting 
techniques was implemented with Andersen’s assistance and approval. Each also was designed so 
that Enron could report the SPE transactions in a manner that was materially more favorable 
than their economic substance’. Arthur Andersen was also subsequently accused of obstruction 
of justice for shredding documents related to its audit of Enron, but was later acquitted by the 
Supreme Court. It settled for $72.5 million in a class-action suit filed by Enron’s investors, and 
agreed to pay $16 million to Enron’s creditors to settle claims of negligence.  
In addition to Arthur Andersen, several highly prestigious banks and law firms were implicated. 
Nine financial institutions: J.P. Morgan Chase; Citigroup; Merrill Lynch; Credit Suisse First 
Boston; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce; Bank America; Barclays Bank; Deutsche Bank; 
and Lehman Brothers, were named as key players in a series of fraudulent transactions that 
ultimately cost shareholders more than $25 billion. Each was accused of having helped Enron 
understate its debt and overstate its cash flow, by means of the deals they conducted. An email 
from J.P. Morgan Chase dated November 25, 1998, clarified how ‘Enron loves these deals, as 
they are able to hide funded debt from their equity analysts because they (at the very least) book 
it as deferred [revenue] or (better yet) bury it in their trading liabilities’ (CNN, 2002). According 
                                                            
† ‘Special purpose entities’ are legal entities created to fulfill specific, often temporary objectives, such as the 
financing of large projects or acquisitions of companies. 
Page 5 of 31
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jpo
Manuscripts submitted to Journal of Professions and Organization
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
6 
 
 
 
to Robert Roach, Chief Investigator for the Senate Subcommittee, ‘the evidence indicates that 
Enron would not have been able to engage in the extent of the accounting deceptions it did, 
involving billions of dollars, were it not for the active participation of major financial institutions 
willing to go along with and even expand upon Enron’s activities’. Most banks, however, settled 
without admitting any wrongdoings.  
Two law firms - Vinson & Elkins and Kirkland & Ellis - were added to the list of Enron 
defendants, accused of ‘malpractice’ because they failed to respond to red flags about Enron’s 
accounting practices (Batson Report, 2003: 48). Vinson & Elkins, in particular, gave Enron its 
approval to the accounting treatment the company ‘sought for its transactions’ (Batson Report, 
2003: 48), thereby enabling it to report them at a much higher value than they warranted. Both 
law firms settled with the company and its shareholders without admitting guilt. In retrospect, 
Carrey (2003: 1) was prompted to ask: ‘…where were the lawyers?’ 
Financial analysts constitute a further group of gatekeepers who were criticized for not taking 
into account the company’s cryptic ‘mark to market’ accounting, which allowed Enron to include 
as current earnings the profits they expected from future contracts, and for staying positive in 
their assessments and ratings well after the company’s earnings had begun to plummet, when 
many of the contracts evaporated. As late as October 2001, up to the brink of its bankruptcy, all 
15 analysts who produced analyses and recommendations on Enron’s shares, rated Enron a ‘buy’, 
and 12 of them actually called it a ‘strong buy’. Even as late as November 8, the date of Enron’s 
disclosure that nearly five years of earnings would have to be recalculated, 11 of the 15 analysts 
recommended buying the stock. Only three analysts issued ‘holds’ and one a ‘strong sell’. At the 
Enron hearings, Howard Schilit, an independent analyst, argued that ‘for any analyst to say there 
were no warning signs in the public filings, they could not have been reading the same public 
filings as I did’ (Forbes, 2002). 
It was not until just four days before Enron declared bankruptcy that the three major credit 
rating agencies (i.e., Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch) lowered their ratings of the company 
to below the mark of a safe investment. The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee noted how 
‘ratings have taken on great significance in the market, with investors trusting that a good credit 
rating reflects the results of a careful, unbiased and accurate assessment by the credit rating 
agencies of the rated company. But as with so many other market players, Enron caused this 
legendary reliability to be called into question’, and that ‘the credit rating agencies did not 
perform as expected…the agencies did not perform a thorough analysis of Enron’s public filings; 
did not pay appropriate attention to allegations of financial fraud; and repeatedly took company 
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officials at their word, without asking probing, specific questions – despite indications that the 
company had misled the rating agencies in the past’ (Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. 
2002: 97, 108).  
 
Parmalat 
Parmalat - a former food multinational based in Collecchio, a small town near Parma, in Italy – 
practiced ‘one of the largest and most brazen corporate financial frauds’ (SEC, 2003) over a 
period of 13 years. The fraud started in 1990, when the company was listed on the Milan Stock 
Exchange, and ended in 2003, when the company defaulted on an expiring bond and had to file 
for bankruptcy protection. Manipulation of financial statements started immediately after the 
IPO, but the practice increased sharply in 1998 as the company experienced increasing difficulty 
in meeting market expectations. In 2002, Parmalat reported net earnings of €252 million, while in 
reality it had incurred a loss of €918 million. In the same year, Parmalat’s reported book value 
was €1,541 million, while in fact there was a negative book value of around €8.5 billion. The final 
‘hole’ left by the company amounted to €14 billion – almost twice the Group’s 2002 annual sales 
turnover.  
As in the Enron case, surprisingly few – if any – financial analysts had misgivings. In 2002, 21 of 
29 analysts’ reports issued on Parmalat suggested ‘buying’ the company’s shares; seven suggested 
‘holding’ them; and only one suggested that they should be sold. Even up to a few months before 
bankruptcy, over 85% of the reports issued by financial analysts were still suggesting that 
investors either ‘buy’ or ‘hold’ the company’s shares. A few days before the fraud was detected, 
57 out of 66 equity research reports recommended buying or holding the company’s shares, 
whereas only eight contained a ‘sell’ recommendation. The Expert of the Public Prosecutor in the 
Parmalat case argued that analysts could have questioned the company’s financial structure long 
before December 2002, when Merrill Lynch analysts for the first time pointed to the company’s 
‘inefficient balance sheet management’ (Merrill Lynch, 05-12-2002). Further, analysts have been 
accused of not developing an independent evaluation. As Dan Ackman, a Forbes journalist and 
lawyer, sarcastically noted ‘the analysts say they reached their conclusions separately. But, even in 
a universe where two-thirds of the recommendations are “buy”, the mathematical odds of a 
dozen analysts all reaching the same conclusion independently are less than one-in-100’ (Forbes, 
2002). 
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In 2002, Standard & Poor’s, which had assigned Parmalat a BBB- rating since 2000, increased its 
outlook from stable to positive. The rating agency downgraded the company only in December 
2003 when Parmalat was already on the verge of bankruptcy. The Public Prosecutor of the 
Parmalat case pointed out that even though the Group’s balance sheets ‘were abundantly false’, 
rating agencies had shown no concern over ‘the poor contribution to the Group EBITDA of the 
main operative company Parmalat SpA’, and concluded that rating agencies would have raised 
concerns about the soundness of Parmalat’s aggregated results had they identified that ‘less than 
15% of the Group’s 2002 margins were accounted for by the parent company’ whereas Bonlat 
allegedly accounted for a much higher percentage (Public Prosecutor, Parma). 
Deloitte and Touche, which audited Parmalat’s group accounts from 1999 to 2003, consistently 
issued unqualified audit opinions, indicating that the company’s accounts were correct and 
reliable. Only at the end of October 2003, did Deloitte & Touche issue a ‘disclaimer’ on the 
company’s 2003 first-half financial accounts because the true value of its investment in Epicurum 
(whose value had previously been reviewed – and approved – by Grant Thornton) could not be 
determined. The Court of Milan scathingly noted that ‘the fact that Deloitte didn’t say anything 
about the company’s 2002 financial statements is rather peculiar’ (Sentence, Court of Milan: 187).  
Grant Thornton, which audited Parmalat’s financial accounts from 1990 to 1998 and the financial 
statements of several off-shore companies within the Group (including Bonlat, Parmalat’s 
‘garbage can’), helped the company hide its debt and losses. One of Grant Thornton’s partners 
later admitted:  
‘we went to talk to Tonna to find a way to hide the company’s problems… from the 
new auditors. The solution devised was to create a new financial company located in 
the Cayman Islands – namely, Bonlat – in which they could hide the “problematic” 
entries. Grant Thornton was to audit this company, so that “no one would look into 
it” ... Bianchi said that he fully understood what was the initial role of Bonlat and that 
he anticipated - or, rather, preferred not to understand - the fictitious nature of many 
other operations that, year after year, passed through Bonlat’ (Sentence, Court of 
Milan: 239).  
Both Deloitte and Touche and Grant Thornton were heavily censured and fined. 
Leading international banks - Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, UBS, and Citigroup - and large 
Italian banks repeatedly worked with Parmalat and they, too, raised no concerns about its 
financial situation. They assisted the company in various bond issues, private placements, and 
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mergers and acquisitions, and never once questioned the company or its management. According 
to Codacons, the Italian Consumer Association, banks ‘sold investors “waste paper” that they 
had not checked’ (Corriere della Sera, 2011). In addition, investment banks have been accused of 
not informing the public about the actual conditions of the companies in which they had 
invested, once these conditions had become clear to them, and, of having artificially inflated the 
company’s shares, so as to give investors the impression of a healthy company (for a trenchant 
critique of the behaviour of investment banks, see Santoro & Strauss, 2013).   
Gian Paolo Zini, Parmalat’s former lawyer, prepared the documents that Calisto Tanzi, the (then) 
CEO of Parmalat, had to sign in order to hide the company’s fraud. In the hearings at the Court 
of Milan, Tanzi explained that he repeatedly did so at the request of Tonna, Parmalat’s CFO, and 
Zini, and that he personally did not understand ‘the technicalities used to fake the transactions’. 
He commented that Tonna and Zini had ‘remarkable skills as fraudsters’ (Sentence, Court of 
Milan: 89).  
Financial journalists constantly praised the company, noting how Parmalat was one of the very 
few Italian companies to ‘conquer the world’ and that had the ability to ‘represent Italy’ (Il Sole 24 
Ore, 25-02-1992). And although Consob (the Italian Securities and Exchange Commission) asked 
Parmalat to provide more information about its activity, the Commission was apparently satisfied 
with the answers provided by the company. 
The evident conclusion is that in the Enron and Parmalat cases the network of gatekeepers did 
not perform their collective responsibility, which begs the following question: How can we 
explain the clear failure of the gatekeepers? 
 
THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
Professionals and corporate corruption 
There has been a long-standing interest in the ethical dimension of professional behaviour and 
the role of the professional firm, an interest at the core of the debate over the place of 
professions in modern society. That debate pivots upon whether the privileges of 
professionalization, embedded in a state sanctioned monopoly of supply and the right of self-
regulation, are necessary because of the social functions that they serve (e.g., Friedson, 1994), 
and/or whether they are vehicles of stratification and abuse (e.g., Johnson, 1972; MacDonald, 
1995). 
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A different and less overtly political way of approaching the dilemma uses the language of 
institutional theory. Professional firms are conceptualized as embodying two ‘logics’. First, a 
‘trusteeship logic’ (Brint, 1994) in which professionals temper the pursuit of personal (usually 
economic) gain, in order to further the interests of their clients within a framework of 
regulations; and, second, a market or commercial logic, which involves harnessing and marketing 
expertise to those able to pay for it. Professional firms, according to this language, are ‘hybrid’ 
organizations (Pache & Santos, 2010: 2013; Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011) in 
which two logics are concurrently pursued. They are, thus, inevitably conflicted sites in which 
professionals experience ‘institutional tension’ as they seek to retain an appropriate balance 
between the imperatives and demands of the two logics (Lander et al., 2013: 130; see also, Muzio 
et al., 2013). The imagery is of a struggle to appropriately accommodate disparate sets of 
institutional prescriptions.  
Critics have long pointed to the asymmetry of knowledge in the relationship between 
professional and client and recognized the risk that professional firms might temper their 
commitment to the trusteeship logic, and pursue their self-interest (Robinson, 1978; Knapp, 
1985; Sharma, 1997; Louwers, 1998). For the most part, however, until the 1960s it was largely 
assumed that professionals would not engage in professional misbehaviour because of the lattice 
of normative controls that ensure an appropriate balance between the trusteeship and 
commercial logics (Zeff, 2003(a): 2003(b)).  
Sharma (1997) summarizes this optimistic position by identifying four controls that, it was 
believed, would underpin the trusteeship logic and ensure professional behaviour. First, he 
suggests that if a professional and client interact regularly, opportunistic behaviour is less likely to 
occur because ‘increasing trust …generates the expectation that one will not undermine the 
other’s interests even in the face of countervailing short term opportunities’. A second control is 
the profession itself, which monitors and regulates members. Employing organizations make up a 
third control, in that peers within professional service firms are assumed to press and enforce 
normative compliance; and, in any case, the potential risk to a firm’s reputation should 
professional misconduct occur will make an organization vigilant. Finally, Sharma suggests that 
clients can be an effective check upon misconduct to the extent that they have in-house expertise 
able to deal effectively with outside experts. Implicit in this analysis is that the problem is how to 
control the professional, not the client, and the optimistic conclusion is that it is achieved.  
The position of clients, of course, can be affected by how they are organized. Merton (1957) and 
Rex (1970), for example, observed that large clients can provide a strong legitimate influence for 
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a profession, lending credibility to its activities and helping establish its claims of value. But these 
studies ignored the possibility that clients might subvert professional conduct. In the 1980s and 
1990s, however, the potentially adverse influence of clients was increasingly recognized. Knapp 
(1985), for example, observed that clients with better financial records are more able to influence 
their advisors. Similarly, Louwers (1998) pointed to a client’s size and the length of the 
professional relationship as factors that strengthen the position of the client. Hackenbrack and 
Nelson (1996) noted that the client’s influence is higher when the level of engagement risk is low 
and Lord (1992) suggested that clients are less dominated when professionals are subject to 
market competition. Overall, these studies questioned the earlier assumption of highly dependent 
and thus vulnerable clients by pointing to factors that strengthen the position of the client. 
Nevertheless, the recurrent tone of these studies was that clients are only relatively less dependent 
upon their advisors, highlighting the importance of Sharma’s four sets of controls.  
Events of recent years have qualified and undermined the optimistic stance of previous decades. 
Moore et al. (2006: 12) believe that ‘auditor independence has remained and elusive promise…’. 
Sikka (2009: 430), also referring to accounting firms, puts it more bluntly: 
‘There is evidence that major firms have participated in price fixing, fraud, bribery, 
corruption, money laundering, falsification of clients financial statements, audit 
reports and, despite repeated warnings and fines, have ignored rules on auditor 
independence’.  
Similarly, policy makers are today clearly less sanguine about the motivation or capability of the 
professions and of professional service firms to appropriately balance the trusteeship and 
commercial logics. The Sarbanes-Oxley reform directly signals that professional self-regulation is, 
at best incomplete and, at worst, a myth. Moreover, the professions themselves are concerned. 
Suddaby, Gendron and Lam (2009: 409) note that ‘the dubious relationship between Arthur 
Andersen and Enron, as well as the apparent inability of even elite members of the profession to 
self-regulate,…have initiated an era of critical self-appraisal among accountants’.  
Admittedly, not all studies are pessimistic. Lander et al. (2013: 144) conclude that ‘the sun is not 
setting on professionalism in mid-tier accounting firms’ (for contrary examples in the UK, 
however, see Sikka, 2009: 430-431). Similarly, Suddaby, Gendron and Lam (2009: 424) concluded 
that attitudes about professional commitment remain high. Nevertheless, the dominant position 
of recent years sees the relationship between professionals and their clients less as one that 
advantages the professional than as one characterized by ‘client capture’. The notion of the 
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‘independent’ professional, for many observers, is a sham (Leicht & Fennel, 2001). Client capture 
implies that professionals lose their independence (see Hanlon, 1994; Bazerman et al., 1997; 
Bazerman & Moore, 2011; Wilmott & Sikka, 1997). For example, contrary to the earlier view that 
a professional firm would diligently work to protect its reputation by nurturing the trusteeship 
logic, Macy and Sale (2003: 1168) propose that ‘incentive structures within accounting firms make 
it virtually impossible for individual auditors to be independent of significant clients because the 
professional’s success depends on the quality of the relationship they form with the top managers 
of the client they are auditing’. Similarly, Klimentchenko (2009) and Sikka (2009) underline that 
audit firms have become reluctant to challenge their clients for fear of losing the audit and any 
add-on assignments. 
The lengthy debate over the appropriateness of multi-disciplinary partnerships (e.g., Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2001; Greenwood et al., 2002; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) speaks to this same 
concern. Critics have highlighted how accounting firms that offer consultancy services may use 
the audit function ‘as a springboard to more lucrative consulting services’ and provide only 
cursory audit (Levitt, 2000; see also, Coffee, 2006). Further, firms that offer both audit and 
consultancy services ‘impair investor confidence in auditor independence and lead to declining 
confidence in public capital markets’ (SEC, 2000). To date, however, there is no conclusive 
evidence that providing both audit and consultancy services reduces audit quality (e.g., Frankel et 
al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Kinney et al., 2004; Knechel & Sharma, 2012).  
Nevertheless, Wyatt (2004)‡ points to the expansion of accounting firms into the provision of 
consultancy services as one cause of the decline of professional standards and the erosion of 
auditor independence. He illustrates this thesis by tracing the evolution and subsequent demise of 
Arthur Andersen over a period of 40 years, concluding that the hiring of non-accountants 
introduced (in the terms of Pache & Santos, 2010) ‘representatives’ of the commercial logic, thus 
adversely shifting the ‘internal culture’:  
‘It wasn’t that consulting personnel was unprofessional in performing their work, it 
was that their actions and behaviour were far more commercially driven than would 
be acceptable for audit personnel. The consultants did not focus on investor or 
creditor interests, and their attitudes gradually affected how auditors approached 
their work’ (Wyatt, 2004: 50).  
                                                            
‡ For a similar but more detailed account that reaches similar conclusions, see Zeff, 2003(a): 2003(b).  
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In our terms, Wyatt’s argument is that the balance between the trusteeship and commercial logics 
tilted in favour of the latter; and ‘undermined the core values of the professional firm’ (Wyatt, 
2004: 50). Much of this thesis, of course, is well-known. But an important sub-theme in the 
Wyatt story is worth highlighting. He connects the organization of professional work within 
professional service firms and the decline of audit standards to wider social processes:  
‘Client share prices were rising in the booming stock market, executives were 
becoming wealthy (on paper at least), and accounting partners felt entitled to 
participate in the economic boom by achieving increasing earnings in their firms… 
In retrospect, it is easy to see the greed factor at work’ (Wyatt, 2004: 49).  
Turning to the behaviour of analysts, a similar story can be told. Research has provided 
convincing evidence of the conflicts of interests that arise when investment banks provide both 
investment and rating services. Dugar and Nathan (1995) and Hayward and Boeker (1998) show 
that financial analysts within brokerage firms that also provide investment banking services are 
more optimistic in their earnings forecasts and investment recommendations relative to other 
analysts (although see Cowen et al., 2006 for opposite results). Lin and McNichols (1998) found 
that the growth forecasts and recommendations of lead and co-underwriter analysts were 
significantly more favorable than those made by unaffiliated analysts. Michaely and Womack 
(1999 – see also O’Brien et al., 2005 and Barber et al., 2007) observed how stocks that 
underwriter analysts recommend performed more poorly than the ‘buy’ recommendations of 
unaffiliated brokers prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the recommendation date and 
concluded that the recommendations by underwriter analysts show significant evidence of bias. 
Even independent analysts, however, may succumb to a firm’s pressures in order to maintain 
useful relationships with senior management (Ke & Yu, 2006; Westphal & Clement, 2008). 
Analysts may be tempted to issue overly optimistic earnings forecasts in order to please the 
corporation’s management (e.g., Francis & Philbrick, 1993; Das et al., 1998; Lim, 2001; 
Matsumoto, 2002; Richardson et al., 2004). 
**** 
The shift towards a more pessimistic portrayal of the independence and professionalism of 
professional service firms has directed increasing attention to understanding the context and 
influences upon professional behaviour. And, despite many insights (for reviews, see Jain, 2001; 
Palmer, 2012; Greve et al., 2010), we clearly have much more to learn about professional 
behaviour and its relationship to corporate corruption. Here, however, we wish to push for 
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further research into the interaction between different types of professional firms§ (rather than into 
the dyadic relations between a professional firm and its client); and suggest a particular 
mechanisms - ‘institutional ascription’ (Gabbioneta et al., 2013) - that we believe deserves special 
attention, partly because it has been widely neglected; and, perhaps more importantly, because it 
may be an especially important collective mechanism.  
 
Institutional ascription  
Gabbioneta et al. (2013) emphasize that a limiting assumption of much previous work is the 
emphasis given to dyadic relationships – such as the relationship between an auditor and a client, 
or an analyst and a client. This assumption underplays the level of embeddedness that develops 
from the repeated and prolonged interactions between clients and their multiple advisors; and, it 
ignores the frequent close relationship between those advisors. Yet, as we highlighted earlier, 
many (perhaps most) cases of corporate corruption involve – although in different permutations 
– a multiplicity of interacting professional firms. Accounting, law, consultancy, investment firms 
and rating agencies are often implicated at the same time. Thus, as noted by Palmer (2012: 36), 
‘most wrongful courses of action require at least the tacit cooperation of others and thus are at 
least nominally collective’. Hence, we need to give greater attention to the network of gatekeepers. 
And it is in this context that Gabbioneta et al. introduce the idea of institutional ascription.  
Institutional ascription within professional networks occurs when professionals assume that 
other professionals are behaving ‘professionally’- that is, when professionals assume that other 
professionals have conducted and completed their work honestly and diligently, and consistent 
with the idealized version of professional behaviour. This assumption, in turn, makes them 
accept uncritically the work done by other professionals. It mitigates the perceived need for more 
probing critical inquiry and removes any semblance of a second opinion; or, as academics would 
put it, of triangulation of evidence and analyses. Professionals assume that the opinions expressed 
by other professionals are reliable and robust, and - importantly - base their own work also on 
these opinions.  Ascription is consistent with the ‘moral seduction’ thesis put forward by Moore 
et al. (2006) who emphasize that, contrary to popular imagery, corruption is often not an 
                                                            
§ Not all studies are exclusive dyadic in their focus. There has been an interest in mimetic behavior amongst 
investment analysts (e.g., Welch, 2000). But these studies do not open out to the network of gatekeepers. However, 
these studies confirm that analysts do not conduct rigorous independent analyses. Welch concludes: ‘I am inclined to 
interpret this evidence as supportive of theories in which analysts follow the consensus, based on little or no information’ 
(2000: 386; emphasis added).  
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occurrence of a personal decision to deviant from an ethical code, but the outcome of systemic 
structural features that shape professional behaviour.  
The assumption that others are acting professionally means that, if any link in a professional 
network is weak, the entire network is at risk of ‘contagion’ and thus vulnerable to collective 
blindness. The initial weakness propagates inside the network as more and more professionals 
rely on the work of other professionals to reach their own – supposedly independent – 
assessment of the firm. The initial involvement of a few actors results in the entire network being 
implicated in the failure to expose corporate corruption. As a consequence, networks of 
professionals, which are supposed to act as gatekeepers against corporate corruption, may 
actually - albeit unwittingly - enable its concealment because of reciprocal and socially 
emphasized processes of collective ascription.  
In the two cases summarized above, we see several instances of ascription.  
Primary auditors assumed that secondary auditors had behaved ‘professionally’, that is to say, that 
they diligently examined the accounts of the companies within the group. Until 2002, Deloitte 
and Touche based its ‘unconditional opinion’ on the group’s accounts also on the work of Grant 
Thornton, which at that time audited a number of Parmalat’s subsidiaries, including Bonlat, the 
group’s ‘garbage can’ (Sentence, Court of Milan: 54). Auditors from Deloitte and Touche stated 
clearly: ‘our opinion, contained in this report, as far as the values of these subsidiaries reported in 
the consolidated accounts, relies also on the work of these auditors’ (Parmalat Annual Report, 
2000). Only in 2002, did Deloitte and Touche decide to check Bonlat’s accounts: finding 
themselves unable to determine the amount of money invested by the company in the Epicurum 
fund, the auditors for the first time issued a ‘conditional opinion’ on the group’s accounts 
(Sentence, Court of Milan). As The Economist (2004) put it, ‘Deloitte seems to have accepted 
Grant Thornton’s audits unquestioningly, while bankers and investors took the audited group 
figures as reassurance that, although complex, the group’s finances were essentially sound’. And, 
according to the Court of Milan, ‘The crime of false audit committed by the principal auditor 
Deloitte and Touche is an inevitable consequence of the crime referred to in Chapter D [false 
audit by Grant Thornton]: when Penca and Bianchi provided false data to the principal auditor, 
they knew that the latter would also provide a false certification’ (Sentence, Court of Milan: 244). 
Credit rating agencies, subsequently, based their ratings on the data contained in financial 
statements that they assumed has been ‘properly’ checked. What they did not do, was conduct 
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their own detailed and systematic independent analysis. The Committee that investigated the role 
of the rating agencies in the Enron case was very clear in this respect:  
‘the agencies did not perform a thorough analysis of Enron’s public filings; did not 
pay appropriate attention to allegations of financial fraud; and repeatedly took 
company officials at their word, without asking probing, specific questions – despite 
indications that the company had misled the rating agencies in the past’ (Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee, 2002: 108). 
Former SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner testified that his own initial review of Enron’s 
financial statements raised more questions than they answered and that anyone doing a similar 
review should have noted their opacity. At the hearings, however, when Chairman Lieberman 
asked analysts whether in retrospect, they felt they should have asked more questions of Enron, 
Ronald Barone of Standard and Poor’s responded, ‘Senator, we rely on the audited financial 
statements . . . . We are not forensic accountants, if that is the question, and we don’t have 
subpoena power. . . .’. To which, Mr. Pellecchia, a Fitch analyst, added: ‘… A company’s public 
certified financial statements are the bedrock of any analysis of the value or the prospects of a 
company’s stock’. Concerns about excessive reliance upon the work of auditors were raised also 
in the Parmalat case, when the Public Prosecutor highlighted how rating analysts ‘did not develop 
a true analysis of the company’s financial statements’, which would have shown that these 
statements ‘were abundantly false’ (Public Prosecutor, Parma).   
Audit firms, in turn, relied also on the work done by law firms. When asked if she ‘thought that 
because Vincent & Elkins had said there was no problem, …that did not trigger any kind of 
requirement...’, Nancy Temple, in-house attorney for Arthur Andersen, answered that she ‘noted 
that the law firm reported that there was nothing further to follow up on at that point in time; 
and this was a very large law firm representing Enron Corporation’. Similarly, in the Parmalat 
hearings, Marco Verde – one of the auditors working for Parmalat - testified that ‘during the 
meeting, Del Soldato tried to convince him that they had correctly valued the transaction and, 
then, asked Gian Paolo Zini…to tell them his opinion. Zini confirmed Del Soldato’s version and 
promised that, in a few days, he would send a memo…. The memo in question didn’t arrive in 
time... as soon as he [Mr. Verde] received the document, he…talked about it with Bianchi, who 
said that “if a lawyers who…is an expert in these matters says such a thing, at least we have a 
memo that justifies us”. Verde also pointed out that even Penca agreed on accepting Zini’s 
version’ (Sentence, Court of Milan: 76). 
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Likewise, securities analysts formulated their investment recommendations using financial data 
they thought had been diligently audited, and also relied on the credit ratings provided by the 
rating agencies. As one analyst told The New York Times (2001): ‘he persisted in recommending 
the stock’ because he didn’t ‘think accountants and auditors would have allowed total 
shenanigans’. In some cases, analysts clearly stated in their equity reports their reliance on the 
work of auditors and/or rating agencies. Analysts at Cheuvreux, for example, noted that 
‘S&P reiterated its positive outlook on Parmalat. The positive outlook reflects that 
Parmalat’s ratings could be upgraded by one notch in the medium term, if the 
expected improvement in the group’s credit measures materializes and the 
macroeconomic and currency environment in LatAm stabilizes’ (Cheuvreux, 2003).  
Similarly, Curt Launer of Credit Suisse First Boston wrote that  
‘the so-called LJM Partnerships were fully disclosed in Enron’s financial statements 
and were subject to appropriate scrutiny by Enron’s board, outside auditors and outside 
legal counsel. Considering the disclosures made and the appropriateness of the 
accounting treatment… we anticipate that the negative sentiment surrounding these 
issues will dissipate over time’ (CSFB, 2001; emphasis added).  
At the Enron hearings, Charles Prince from Citibank said that he  
‘never anticipated that a financial intermediary like Citigroup would be criticized for 
the accuracy of the accounting treatment that a Fortune 10 company gave to its 
transactions with the express approval of a then-highly respected Big Five accounting 
firm’  
and that  
‘at the time we entered into these transactions, we never imagined that Arthur 
Andersen wouldn’t even exist a year later or that a failure of ethics would have 
destroyed Enron, a company ranked in the top 20 on the list of most admired 
companies in the year 2001’. 
He also admitted that  
‘…in hindsight, our people were too comfortable with what was told to us by the 
outside auditors, the law firms that structured and closed these transactions, and 
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Enron themselves. I think that at that time we did not view ourselves as being 
responsible for what Enron did with its own books’.  
Similarly, Rick Caplan, a senior professional from Citigroup, noted how ‘in December 2000, 
when the Fishtail transaction was agreed to, the firm had no reason to believe that any such 
determinations were not being made by Enron and/or Arthur Andersen, which was then one of 
the Nation’s premier accounting firms, in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles’. 
In other cases, analysts mindlessly reproduced a customary practice in financial markets. As one 
of our informants candidly admitted, 
‘we actually do something similar to an act of faith… if we know that those who have 
more information than we do have already expressed a positive opinion, to same 
extent we raise our hands... and consider the financial situation as given… we do not 
question… [issues] on which rating agencies have already given their opinion...’ (interview; 
emphasis added). 
Investment banks also assumed that inspectors at Consob (the Italian equivalent of the U.S. SEC) 
had done their work diligently. Yet, it had failed to do so, as was caustically noted by the Judge of 
the Court of Milan, who partially ‘absolved’ the Bank of America: ‘Why should Bank of America 
protest when Consob performs an inspection activity - with much wider powers… at the end of 
which no irregularities are found and the accounting figures provided are approved, and Consob 
invites the Group to keep that meritorious and comprehensive level of disclosure and 
transparency in the future?’ (Sentence, Court of Milano: 325).  
In sum, in both the Enron and Parmalat cases, the professionals involved ascribed probity and 
rigor to the work of other professionals and, by doing that, felt less need to dig deeply in 
performing their own, supposedly independent analyses. There was a ring of reliance and 
unquestioning ascription of trust to others’ professionalism. In consequence, there was a 
triangulation of complacency. The paradox, in other words, is that professionals trusted other 
professionals whilst being ‘unprofessional’ themselves. This paradox indicates that a central 
challenge confronting professions and professional firms is not simply guarding against the risk 
of the commercial logic dominating the trusteeship logic (although that risk is highly significant) 
but also of ensuring that the practices and behaviors of the trusteeship logic are actually 
implemented even in the absence of commercial pressures. In institutional terms, professional 
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behaviours associated with the trusteeship logic cannot be assumed to be self-reinforcing; they 
require institutional maintenance (Lawrence et al., 2009). 
 
A RESEARCH AGENDA 
We have advocated the need to understand the network of professionals that circle corporations 
and the role that this network plays in uncovering and/or concealing processes and practices of 
corporate corruption. In particular, we have elaborated the neglected mechanism of institutional 
ascription. We conclude by proposing lines of future inquiry. 
First, research should go beyond the traditional focus upon the dyadic relationship between firms 
and their clients. We need to investigate the relationships between professional firms, and probe 
their nature, the mechanisms of reproduction, and their consequences. In particular, it is 
important to explore whether repeated involvement of the same firms over time increases the 
incidence of neglected fraud. As we noted earlier, the idea that audit firms may be ‘captured’ by 
their clients and constrain the application of the trusteeship logic is a recurrent, pervasive theme 
in the accounting literature. What is missing from this literature, however, is an analysis of 
whether prolonged relations between a corporation and other professional firms may wittingly or 
unwittingly lead to ‘unprofessional’ behaviour.  
In this respect, we also need to learn more about whether some relationships between 
professional firms are particularly at risk of ‘missing’ corruption, and about why that may be the 
case. There are, as we have already noted, studies that focus on the possible conflicts of interest 
that arise when a firm provides audit and consultancy services, or when a bank acts as investment 
bank and as broker. These studies, however, neglect the possibility that conflicts of interests may 
arise between professional service firms. For example, one may question how ‘independent’ is a 
broker who has repeated and frequent relationships with the same investment bank; or, how 
‘independent’ consultants are from auditors that may ‘suggest their name’ to potential clients. If 
supposedly independent professional firms are actually dependent and/or overly reliant upon 
each other, then the question is raised whether this ‘dependence’ may be problematic. 
Enquiries of this sort would provide opportunities to explore the key conduits through which 
networks and relationships are cemented and reinforced. For example, client personnel can be a 
key conduit for the maintenance and reinforcement of professional networks. In the case of 
Enron, the firm’s head of legal services previously worked for Vinson & Elkins, their external 
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legal advisor. A Vinson & Elkins partner, in charge of the Enron account, used to be an Enron 
employee. Many of Enron’s in-house accountants were ex Arthur Andersen employees. In this 
case the conduits for creating the network of professionals came through the client. Another 
conduit of professional networks could be the movement of human capital that happens between 
large multidisciplinary professional service firms, because of status and reputational equivalence. 
It is likely that such movement forms the basis of initiating networks that may be susceptible to 
ascription. 
The movement of human capital across professional service firms is also related to the pressures 
of size and diversification that these firms experience. Increasing sophistication of in-house 
counsel and accounting departments, combined with pressures of finding and maintaining a 
growing roster of clients in a recessed economy, is prompting professional service firms to 
provide unique, highly specialized services. For global professional service firms this pressure to 
specialize involves diversification through horizontal acquisitions. An implication for their clients 
is a narrower range of options when selecting professional advisors. Ernst & Young, for example, 
are the professional firm of choice for technology firms because of the firm’s acquired expertise 
in areas of intellectual property rights as well as in technology and digital growth. It is interesting 
to note that large Internet companies such as Google, Twitter, Square and Amazon all have Ernst 
& Young as their external auditor. Google, Twitter and Square also happen to share the same 
external legal counsel. This commonality does not imply that there is, or will be, professional 
misbehaviour, but it does illustrate the intertwined relationships that connect professional service 
firms by virtue of their having a common set of influential clients and that thus increase the risk 
factor of ascription. 
Another condition that may influence the incidence of ascription is the length and frequency of 
the relationships between professional service firms. Frequent, long-lasting relationships may 
reduce the perceived likelihood of opportunistic behaviour and this, in turn, may facilitate 
ascription of diligence and competence to the other firm. A third condition that may foster 
institutional ascription is geographical proximity, which enables frequency of interaction and the 
development of shared norms of understanding. Professionals that meet face-to-face and who 
socialize together may be more likely to ascribe professionalism to each other than are 
professionals that do not know each other. On the other hand, it could be argued that impersonal 
relations might be more conducive to ascription. Face-to-face interaction may work to dispel the 
myth of profession.  
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In raising the importance of institutional ascription we have drawn heavily on two cases that, 
though they clearly implicate several professional firms, heavily emphasise the role of accounting 
firms and financial analysts. It would be interesting to probe whether firms in a particular 
profession are more likely to be the recipient of ascriptive processes; i.e., whether there is a status 
ranking of professions such that outsiders are less likely to question the views and opinions of its 
members. The pronouncements of higher status professions, we suspect, (e.g., law) are less likely 
to be questioned than those of less mature or ‘quasi’ professions (such as management 
consultancy).  
Professions are distinguished not only by their relative status. On the contrary, they vary in the 
strength of their regulatory practices and their ability to oversee their members’ behaviour (von 
Nordenflycht, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011). It follows, therefore, that some professions may be 
more vulnerable than others to failure of regulatory oversight. To the extent that such oversight 
is weak, the probability of institutional ascription is enhanced. That is, institutional ascription will 
occur more readily in professions where self-regulation is weak. Professions themselves, of 
course, are not homogeneous and some member firms, perhaps especially those whose 
boundaries outstrip those of professional regulators, may be less policed (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006; for a fuller discussion of this issue, see Faulconbridge & Muzio, 2011). Yet, it is 
the largest firms that typically receive greater media attention, which might motivate them to 
more careful compliance with, and maintenance of, the trusteeship logic. The interstices of self-
regulation are thus intriguingly multifaceted and complex and comprise promising avenues of 
inquiry. We need to explore and pinpoint the sources and mechanisms of ascription and the 
subset of firms and professions that they implicate. 
The failure of gatekeepers has lead to regulatory initiatives but there are signs that these may be 
being watered down. In the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act were designed to increase accountability of the professions 
(especially accountants and financial analysts) and re-establish trust in the financial market. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act removed self-regulation from the accounting profession by creating the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The Act also imposed significant risk 
compliance requirements for publically traded firms and the compulsory rotation of auditors. An 
unintended consequence was that most of the business related to risk compliance accrued to the 
large professional service firms. Almost a decade after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed, in July 
2013 the House of Representatives approved a bill that prohibits the PCAOB from forcing 
public companies to automatically change or rotate their auditors. Soon after, the United 
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Kingdom moved away from mandatory auditor rotation in favour of ‘audit tendering’ every ten 
years. Similarly, the European Union, in October 2013, agreed to let banks and ‘systemically 
important’ companies retain the same auditor for fifteen years and for other public interest 
entities to do so for twenty years. So the way we see it, the regulatory constraints that may have 
had an impact on the working of professional networks have been debilitated and recent 
compliance requirements have given additional leverage to large professional service firms. How 
these and any further changes affect the incidence of institutional ascription is an intriguing 
question and one that should be monitored. Perhaps more worryingly, the watering down of 
regulatory changes confirms the pessimistic thesis of Tetlock et al (2006:12) that issue cycles in 
the political world’ deflect demands for accountability. 
In much the same way that not all professionals, professional firms and professions are the same, 
neither are clients. Although our emphasis is upon relationships between members of the 
regulatory network, the incidence of institutional ascription will be affected by characteristics of 
the client. Parmalat was a ‘celebrity’ firm (e.g., Rindova et al., 2006; Ahmadjian & Robinson, 
2001) which affected how it was viewed and treated by analysts and rating agencies. Other firm-
level characteristics that might be important include the client’s history and performance, its 
formal governance arrangements, and its reputation. A fuller understanding of ascription, 
therefore, should include analysis of how these and other client characteristics moderate or 
amplify the attitude of gatekeepers, and the circumstances under which they do or do not do so.     
Finally, our two cases - Enron and Parmalat - raise the importance of time. We have emphasized 
that most studies of corruption ignore the duration and focus instead upon its occurrence. For 
us, it would be interesting to explore whether longer durations of corruption are signally 
associated with higher levels of institutional ascription. That is, does the possibility of sustained 
corruption increase if the relationships between gatekeepers are of long standing and 
characterised by institutional ascription? Isolating and comparing the involvement of institutional 
ascription in shorter and longer periods of corruption might be an informative line of inquiry.   
A different aspect of time concerns the era of occurrence. Almost all studies of the financial 
implosion of the last decade point out that it followed a lengthy period of economic growth. Are 
such eras more likely to encourage institutional ascription? The temporal context, in this sense, 
matters. Similarly, it seems reasonable to suppose that the aftermath of highly publicized market 
failures, such as Enron and Parmalat, would sweep away at least some measure of complacent 
ascription. Financial crises ebb and flow (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005): so, too, we suspect, does 
the incidence of institutional ascription.   
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These suggestions for future research are premised on the importance of understanding the 
network of relationships between professional firms, and in particular the mechanism of 
institutional ascription, which undermines the trusteeship logic. Declining trust in the ability of 
professional gatekeepers to properly and effectively discharge their roles as gatekeepers and 
watchdogs or market arrangements is a fundamental problem. It is time to respond. 
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